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The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness 
and financial reporting aggressiveness. Specifically, this study aims to examine the effect of 
book-tax conformity (BTC) level on the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and 
financial reporting aggressiveness. Conceptually, financial reporting aggressiveness is defined as 
upward earnings management. Meanwhile, tax reporting aggressiveness is defined as effort to 
downward taxable income. 
The relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial tax aggressiveness is 
interesting to investigate for two reasons. The first reason, there are two research streams that 
test this relationship. The first stream focuses on testing whether tax reporting aggressiveness 
affects financial reporting aggressiveness (Dhaliwal et al., 2004; Frank et al., 2009; Wang & 
Chen, 2012). From the investors' point of view, tax reporting aggressiveness is an activity that 
maximizing firm value (Kim et al., 2011). As residual claimants, shareholders tend to ask 
manager to do tax avoidance, so they can increase earnings after tax that will be received, 
through dividends. To align the shareholders’ interest, tax avoidance activity can be used as a 
justification for managers to manage earnings (Desai & Dharmapala, 2009).  
In contrast, the second stream focuses on testing whether financial reporting 
aggressiveness affects tax reporting aggressiveness (Frank et al., 2009; Lennox et al., 2012). 
Dhaliwal et al. (2004) states that when a company has an incentive to achieve a certain earnings 
target (e.g. to meet or beat analysts' forecast earnings), current tax expense accounts can be the 
last opportunity to make earnings management. However, managers can also decide to pay taxes 
based on earnings overstatement that have been reported in the financial statements. It is done to 
avoid the suspicion from savvy investors, capital market authorities, and the tax authorities 
(Erickson, et al, 2004; Desai, 2005; Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). However, current research 
has not considered the endogeneity problem. If there is endogeneity problem and it is not solved, 
then it can cause the biased result. This biased result can be reflected in inconclusive results at 
previous research. 
The second reason, the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial 
reporting aggressiveness is also highly depend on BTC level. According to Shackelford and 
Shevlin (2001), the trade-offs of tax reporting and financial reporting faced by managers occur 
because apply the high BTC level. In otherwise, managers that do not face trade-offs occur 
because apply low BTC level (Desai, 2002; Manzon & Plesko, 2002; Mills et al., 2002; Boynton 
et al., 2005; Hanlon et al., 2005; Frank et al., 2009). However, there is no empirical evidence that 
show whether vary BTC level affect the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and 
financial reporting aggressiveness. 
Using a sample of companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for 2013-2016, this 
study aims to fill the gap of previous research (Frank et al., 2009; Lennox et al., 2013). Frank et 
al., 2009 examines the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting 
aggressiveness using ordinary least squares (OLS). If the study indicates any endogeneity 
problem, then OLS may provide biased results. Different from Frank et al. (2009), this study will 
examine the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting 
aggressiveness using two-stage least squares (2SLS) to minimize the biased results.  
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In addition, this study also examines the relationship between tax reporting 
aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness across different BTC level. According to 
Atwood, et al. (2010), the diversity of tax reporting will reflect level of diversity of taxable 
income permitted by taxation authorities in a country. The diversity of tax reporting will also 
reflect the extent of BTC levels permitted by a country. Therefore, this study only used data in 
one country, Indonesia, BTC level is measured by conformity between accounting standards and 
tax laws are allowed across industries. Previous studies have not shown empirical evidence 
related to the impact of BTC levels on the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and 
financial reporting aggressiveness. We predict that the higher BTC level, firm is likely to face 
trade-offs when making financial reporting and tax reporting (Shackelford & Shevlin, 2001). 
Instead, we predict that the lower BTC level, firm has opportunity to make tax reporting 
aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness in the same period (Desai, 2002; Manzon 
& Plesko, 2002; Mills et al., 2002; Boynton et al., 2005 ; Hanlon et al., 2005; Frank et al., 2009). 
This study contributes to the literature examining the relationship between tax reporting 
aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness. This study found that there is endogeneity 
problem in the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting 
aggressiveness, but no causality relationship. In this case, only tax reporting aggressiveness that 
affects financial reporting aggressiveness, but not otherwise. 
In accordance with the predictions, this study also found that firm with a low level of 
BTC is more weakened trade-offs between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting 
aggressiveness than firm with high level of BTC. These results are consistent either with or 
without include the industry dummy. These results support previous research.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. This paper will discuss the theoretical 
foundation and some previous research to develop the hypothesis. In the next section of this 
study will discuss the research design. Furthermore, we will present some of the findings in this 
study. Finally, this study will present conclusions, limitations of research, and development for 
future research. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Relationship between Tax Reporting Aggressiveness and Financial Reporting 
Aggressiveness 
There are two research streams that test the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness 
and financial reporting aggressiveness. The first stream focuses on testing whether tax reporting 
aggressiveness affects financial reporting aggressiveness (Dhaliwal et al., 2004; Frank et al., 
2009; Wang & Chen, 2012). From the investors' point of view, tax reporting aggressiveness is an 
activity that maximizing firm value (Kim et al., 2011). As residual claimants, shareholders tend 
to ask manager to do tax avoidance, so they can increase earnings after tax that will be received, 
through dividends. To align the shareholders’ interest, tax avoidance activity can be used as a 
justification for managers to manage earnings (Desai & Dharmapala, 2009). However, current 
research has not considered the endogeneity problem. If there is endogeneity problem and it is 
not solved, then it can cause the biased result. This biased result can be reflected in conclusive 
results at previous research. 
However, that explanation has not considered the possibility of agency problem between 
managers as agents and shareholders as principals. In Jensen & Meckling (1976), managers also 
have an interest in maximizing their own well-being. Thus, it is possible for managers to not 




always act aligned with interests of shareholders for several reasons (Desai & Dharmapala, 
2009). First, manager needs large effort to make tax reporting aggressiveness. Managers should 
study the loopholes of tax regulations and apply them in day-to-day corporate transactions. 
Second, managers with risk-averse type do not want to imply tax reporting aggressiveness 
strategy because it can be detected by tax authorities and it have potential to be given sanctions. 
In contrast, the second stream focuses on testing whether financial reporting 
aggressiveness affects tax reporting aggressiveness (Frank et al., 2009; Lennox et al., 2012). 
Dhaliwal et al. (2004) states that when a company has an incentive to achieve a certain earnings 
target (e.g. to meet or beat analysts' forecast earnings), current tax expense accounts can be the 
last opportunity to make earnings management. However, managers can also decide to pay taxes 
based on earnings overstatement that have been reported in the financial statements. It is done to 
avoid the suspicion from savvy investors, capital market authorities, and the tax authorities 
(Erickson, et al, 2004; Desai, 2005; Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). 
Erickson et al. (2004) describe four potential tax treatment that can be applied by the 
manager when the company overstated earnings in its financial reporting. First, management 
may choose not to report the overstated earnings report the company and classifies tax on 
temporary differences between accounting standards and tax regulations. Second, manager can 
ignore overstated earnings from taxable income and classifies them as permanent differences 
between accounting standards and tax regulations. Third, manager can report the overstated 
earnings in tax reporting. Fourth, managers can report fictitious earnings on their financial 
statements and then as if paying taxes by the actual amount. 
The current research has not considered the endogeneity problem. If there is endogeneity 
problem and it is not solved, then it can cause the biased result. This biased result can be 
reflected in inconclusive results at previous research. In general, managers may face trade-offs 
when making tax reporting and financial reporting (Shackelford & Shevlin, 2001). Managers 
deciding to upward earnings management in the financial reporting may incur tax costs to report 
higher book income. Similarly, manager deciding to downward taxable income to tax authorities 
may report lower income to shareholders and thereby incur financial reporting costs. In other 
words, financial reporting aggressiveness have negative impact on tax reporting aggressiveness, 
and vice versa. 
Lennox et al. (2013) also found that the impact of tax reporting aggressiveness on the 
probability of firm with accounting fraud is negative and significant. This impact is caused by 
the increasing of opportunity to be monitored by tax authorities (Erickson, et al 2004). Dhaliwal 
et al. (2004) showed that firm will tend to reduce tax avoidance measures to meet or beat 
analysts' forecasts earnings. 
In contrast, Desai (2005) states that manager's decision to make tax reporting 
aggressiveness and fraud will tend to occur simultaneously. Desai (2003) proved that the 
companies involved in tax shelters, tend to increase the accounting earnings. Frank et al. (2009) 
found that financial reporting aggressiveness have a positive impact on tax reporting 
aggressiveness, and vice versa. Based on previous research, we predict that there is an 
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Relationship between Tax Reporting Aggressiveness and Financial Reporting 
Aggressiveness across BTC Levels 
Based on previous research, the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial 
reporting aggressiveness is also highly depend on BTC level. Shackelford & Shevlin (2001) 
explains that theoretically trade-offs of tax reporting and financial reporting faced by managers 
can occur due to apply high level of BTC. In otherwise, managers that do not face trade-offs of 
tax reporting and financial reporting can occur due to apply low level of BTC (Desai, 2002; 
Manzon & Plesko, 2002; Mills et al., 2002; Boynton et al., 2005; Hanlon et Al., 2005; Frank et 
al., 2009). However, there is no empirical evidence that show whether vary BTC level affect the 
relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness. 
According to Atwood, et al. (2010), the diversity of tax reporting will reflect level of 
diversity of taxable income permitted by taxation authorities in a country. The diversity of tax 
reporting will also reflect the extent of BTC levels permitted by a country. Mills & Newberry 
(2001) proves that firms with incentives for earnings management have low level of BTC. The 
magnitude of the difference between accounting earnings and taxable income can be a signal of 
low earnings quality for financial statements users (Chaney & Jeter, 1994; Joos et al., 2002; 
Hanlon, 2003a). Firm with high level of BTC have higher earnings quality than firms with low 
level of BTC (Hanlon, 2005). 
Based on previous studies, we predict that the higher BTC level, firm is likely to face 
trade-offs when making financial reporting and tax reporting (Shackelford & Shevlin, 2001). 
Instead, we predict that the lower BTC level, firm has opportunity to make tax reporting 
aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness in the same period (Desai, 2002; Manzon 
& Plesko, 2002; Mills et al., 2002; Boynton et al., 2005 ; Hanlon et al., 2005; Frank et al., 2009). 
Thus, the hypothesis developed in this study is: 
 
H1: Firm with low level of BTC is more weakened trade-offs between tax reporting 




Data and Sample 
This study uses companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Indonesia was chosen as the 
setting of research because the level of protection of investors in Indonesia is relatively lower 
than other countries (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; Doidge, et al., 2007; Klapper and Love, 2004; 
Mitton, 2002; Claessens et al., 2000). Thus, it appropriate setting to examine the relationship 
between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness. 
Data are taken from the Thomson Reuters Eikon database in the period 2013 to 2016. For 
data that are not available in database, we collect data manually from the financial statements 
downloaded from the official website of Indonesia Stock Exchange, namely www.idx.co.id. 
Industry classification is based on two-digit GICS code. 
We selected the sample based on several criteria. First, we exclude firm that specifically 
regulated in taxation (e.g. Final Income Tax Payers and firm in the financial industry). Second, 
an industry at least consist of ten companies. Third, we exclude firm with incomplete data. 
Lastly, we exclude firm at 1% top and bottom of the sample to solve the outliers. The final 
sample consists of 1.212 firm-years or 303 firms. Table 1 presents the description of the sample 
used in this study based on the composition of industry. 





Sample Description: Industrial Composition 

























Total  1.212 
 
Measurement of Tax Reporting Aggressiveness 
The measurement of tax reporting aggressiveness is following Frank et al. (2009). We consider 
firms to have aggressive tax reporting if they have high discretionary permanent book-tax 
differences. According to Frank et al. (2009), permanent book-tax differences are better measure 
than otherwise (such as total effective tax rates (ETRs), cash ETRs, total discretionary book-tax 
differences) for several reasons. First, permanent differences are more consistent with anecdotal 
evidence regarding the nature of aggressive tax shelter activity. Second, the permanent 
differences are more comparable to total accruals. Third, the measurement of tax reporting 
aggressiveness using temporary differences and cash ETRs could be correlated with the 
measurement of financial reporting aggressiveness. It may cause bias results. 
There is equation used to estimate discretionary permanent differences (DTAX) which has 
been adjusted to the accounting standards and tax regulations in Indonesia: 
∆  (1) 
where: 
PERMDIFFit  = Total book-tax differences less temporary book-tax differences for firm i in year 
t (PTBIit - (CTEit / STRit) - (DTEit / STRit). 
PTBIit   = Pre-tax book income for firm i in year t. 
CTEit   = Current income tax expense of firm i in year t. 
STRit    = Income Tax Rates in year t, 25%. 
DTEit   = Deferred tax expense for firm i in year t. 
INTANGit  = Goodwill and other intangible assets for firm i in year t. 
ΔNOLit  = Changes in net operating loss carryforwards for firm i in year t. 
LAGPERMit  = One-year lagged PERMDIFF for firm i in year t. 
εit   = Discretionary permanent difference (DTAXit) for company i in year t. 
To control firm size, all variables above are scaled by the average total assets in year t-1 and year 
t. Equation (1) are estimated for each industry-year based on two-digit GICS code. Table 2 
presents the average estimation result of equation (1). 
In equation (1), we include variable to control nondiscretionary permanent differences 
not related to tax planning (such INTANGit). Meanwhile, ΔNOLit variable is controlled for 
changes in net operating loss carryforwards related to the change in the valuation allowance 
account that impact on PERMDIFF but not related to tax planning. Finally, we include 
permanent nondiscretionary LAGPERM to control persistent differences over time. Thus, the 
residual (ε) from the equation (1) can be used as a proxy for discretionary permanent differences 
(DTAX). 
 






Estimation Results of Tax Reporting Aggressiveness 













The  dependent  variable  is  PERMDIFFit  that measured  by  total  book‐tax 
differences deducting temporary differences for firm i in year t. INTANGit is 
goodwill  and  other  intangible  assets  for  firm  i  in  year  t.  ΔNOLit  is  the 
change in net operating loss carryforwards for firm i in year t. LAGPERM is 
a  one‐year  lagged  PERMDIFF  for  firm  i  in  year  t.  ε  is  discretionary 
permanent difference (DTAX it) for company i in year t. 
 
Measurement of Financial Reporting Aggressiveness 
We measure financial reporting aggressiveness with modified-Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) 
as follows: 
∆ ∆   (2) 
where: 
TACCit  = Total accruals (PTBIit - (CFOit + ITPit) for firm i in year t. 
CFOit   = Cash flow from operations for firm i in year t. 
ITPit   = Income taxes paid for firm i in year t. 
ΔREVit  = Changes in sales for firm i of year t-1 to year t. 
ΔARit   = Changes in accounts receivables for firm i from year t-1 to year t. 
PPEit   = Gross property, plant, and equipment for firm i in year t. 
ηit   = Discretionary accruals (DFIN) for company i in year t. 
To control firm size, all variables above are scaled by the average total assets in year t-1 and year 
t. Equation (2) are estimated for each industry-year based on two-digit GICS code. This study 
uses pre-tax accruals in the TACC to eliminate the possibility of correlation with tax reporting 
aggressiveness. Table 3 presents the average estimation result of equation (2). 
  






Estimation Result of Financial Reporting Aggressiveness 











The  dependent  variable  is  the  TACCit  that  measured  by  pre‐tax  total 
accruals for firm i in year t. ΔREVit is the change in sales for the company i 
of  year  t‐1  to  year  t.  ΔARit  is  a  change  in  accounts  receivable  for  the 
company  i  of  year  t‐1  to  year  t.  PPEit  is  gross  property,  plant,  and 
equipment  for  firm  i  in  year  t.  ηit  is  discretionary  accruals  (DFIN)  for 
company i in year t. 
 
Measurement of BTC Subsample 
To examine whether the different level of BTC is affect on the relationship between tax reporting 
aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness, we measure the level of BTC following 
Atwood et al. (2010). According to Atwood, et al. (2010), the diversity of tax reporting will 
reflect level of diversity of taxable income permitted by taxation authorities in a country. The 
diversity of tax reporting will also reflect the extent of BTC levels permitted by a country. 
Therefore, this study only used data in one country, Indonesia, BTC level is measured by 
conformity between accounting standards and tax laws are allowed across industries. Thus, we 
measure the level of BTC based on the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) of equation (3) below: 
 (3) 
To control firm size, all variables above are scaled by the average total assets in year t-1 and year 
t. Equation (3) are estimated for each industry-year based on two-digit GICS code. 
In accordance with the explanation before, RMSE indicates management discretion in 
differential between financial reporting and tax reporting, either higher or lower. The larger 
RMSE, the lower level of BTC. Conversely, the smaller RMSE, the higher level of BTC. The 
subsample was obtained by rank the RMSE in each industry-year from the lowest to the highest 
value. We measured small BTC (SBTC) variable as a dummy variable in which "1" for firm with 
RMSE values that greater than median in year t, and "0" for otherwise. 
For robustness check, we uses RankBTC variables measured by descending ranks where 
the highest value of RSME in year t is ranked as 0 and the lowest value of RSME in year t is 
ranked as n-1 (in this case n is the number of industries in year t). As Atwood et al. (2010), we 
then scaled the rankings with n-1 to rank it between 0 and 1. The greater RankBTC, the higher 
level of BTC. Conversely, the smaller RankBTC, the lower level of BTC. 
 
Research Model 
The model in this study is developed from Frank et al. (2009). Different from Frank et al. (2009), 
we examines the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting 
aggressiveness by using 2SLS. Because of there are indications of endogeneity problem, the 
using OLS can provide biased results. There is the basic model used in this study: 
_  (4) 
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∆  (5) 
where: 
PTROAit  = Pre-tax book income for firm i in year t divided by average total assets year t 
and t-1. 
NOL_Dit  = Dummy variable, where "1" if the NOL carryforwards for firm i in year t-1 is 
greater than 0, and "0" for otherwise. 
LEVit   = Total debt firm i in year t divided by average total assets year t and t-1. 
ΔPTCFOit  = Change in operating cash flows before income tax paid for firm i between year t 
and t-1 divided by the average total assets of year t and t-1. 
SIZEit   = Natural log of total assets for firm i in year t. 
In equation (4) and (5), we included control variables associated with the incentive to tax 
plan (PTROAit, NOL_Dit, and LEVit), the incentive to manage earnings (ΔPTCFOit), and firm size 
(SIZEit). However, to ensure their endogeneity problem, this study did endogeneity test and 
Granger causality test first. Based on the results of endogeneity test, it is known that there is 
endogenous problem in the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial 
reporting aggressiveness. However based on Granger causality test results in Table 4, we know 
that there is no causality relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial 
reporting aggressiveness. In this case, only tax reporting aggressiveness that affects on financial 
reporting aggressiveness, but not otherwise. 
Table 4 
Granger Causality Test Results 
Null Hypothesis  F-statistics Prob. 
DFINit does not Granger cause DTAXit  






*, **, *** are significant at the 90%, 95%, 99% confidence level. 
DFINit is discretionary accruals for form i in year t. DTAXit is 
discretionary permanent difference for firm i in year t. 
 
Because of any endogeneity problem, this research will solve it by using 2SLS. Equation 
(4) is the first-stage regression that estimates the predicted value of tax reporting aggressiveness 
(DTAX). Equation (5) is the second-stage regression that estimates the relation between predicted 
tax reporting aggressiveness (PDTAX) and financial reporting aggressiveness (DFIN). The 
estimation results of equations (4) and (5) are presented in Table 5. Table 5 Panel A shows the 
first-stage of regression and Table 5 Panel B shows the second-stage of regression.  
In Table 5 Panel B it is known that tax reporting aggressiveness is positively and 
significantly affects financial reporting aggressiveness. These results support previous research 
that firms have the opportunity to making financial reporting aggressiveness and tax reporting 
aggressiveness in the same period (Desai, 2002; Manzon & Plesko, 2002; Mills et al., 2002; 
Boynton et al., 2005; Hanlon et al ., 2005; Frank et al., 2009). These results may be supported by 
the level of investor protection in Indonesia that relatively lower than other countries (Claessens 
& Yurtoglu, 2013; Doidge, et al., 2007; Klapper & Love, 2004; Mitton, 2002; Claessens et al., 
2000). 
  





Relationship between Tax Reporting Aggressiveness and Financial Reporting 
Aggressiveness (2SLS) 
_  (4) 



































The dependent variable  in  the Panel A  is DTAXit  that measured by discretionary 
permanent difference for firm i in year t. The dependent variable in the Panel B is 
DFINit  that measured  by  discretionary  accruals  for  firm  i  in  year  t.  PDTAXit  is 
predicted value in equation (4) for firm i in year t. PTROAit is pre‐tax book income 
for  firm  i  in year  t divided by average  total assets  in year  t and  t‐1. NOL_Dit  is 







To testing H1, equation (5) was developed to show how the relationship between tax 
reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness across level of BTC. The 
following is the equation used: 
∗ ∆ (6) 
where: 
PDTAXit  = Predicted value in equation (4) for firm i in year t. 
SBTCit  = Dummy variable, where "1" is firm with low level of BTC, and "0" for 
otherwise. 
According to H1, we predict that firm with low level of BTC has opportunity to prepare 
financial reporting aggressiveness and tax reporting aggressiveness in the same period (Desai, 
2002; Manzon & Plesko, 2002; Mills et al., 2002; Boynton et al., 2005; Hanlon et al., 2005; 
Frank et al., 2009). Meanwhile, firm with high levels of BTC are likely to face trade-offs when 
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making financial reporting and tax reporting (Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001). Therefore, we 




Descriptive Statistics  
In Table 6 Panel A is known that mean of DFINit is 0,004 and its median is 0,006. It indicates 
that most of firms in the samples are financial reporting aggressiveness. The mean of PDTAXit is 
-0,001 and its median is -0,002. It indicates that most of firms in the sample are less aggressive 
in tax reporting. Nevertheless, the maximum value of PDTAXit indicates that there are still firm 
that report taxes aggressively. The mean of ΔPTCFOit and SIZEit are 0,009 and 28,463. While 
the mean and median of SBTCit is 0,573 and 1,000. It indicates that 57.3% of firms in industries 
with low level of BTC. 
In Table 6 Panel B is known that mean of DTAXit in the high level of BTC is significantly 
different from mean of DTAXit in the low level of BTC. In this case, firms with high level of 
BTC are more likely to make tax reporting aggressively than firms with low level of BTC. In 
Table 6 Panel B is also known that the mean of DFINit in the high level of BTC is significantly 
different from the mean of DFINit in the low level of BTC. Firms with high level of BTC are 
more likely to make financial reporting aggressively than firms with low level of BTC. 
Table 6 Panel C shows the relationship between variables used in this study. PDTAXit is 
positively and significantly correlated with DFINit. This is an early indication that the greater tax 
reporting aggressiveness, the greater financial reporting aggressiveness. However, we still need 
to test its relations to find out how the influence of tax reporting aggressiveness on financial 
reporting aggressiveness. 
  





Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 































Panel B: DTAXit and DFINit across Level of BTC 
 Mean  Sig. F-test 







p < 0,01*** 
p < 0,01*** 






































a Bold show the significant correlation. 
DFINit is discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. PDTAXit is predicted value in 
equation (4) for firm i in year t. ΔPTCFOit is change in operating cash flows before 
income tax paid for firm i between year t and t-1 divided by the average total assets 
of year t and t-1. SIZEit is a natural log of total assets for firm i in year t. SBTCit is 
dummy variable, where “1” if firm with low level of BTC, and “0” for otherwise. 
 
Regression Analysis 
In Table 7 Panel A, the result of univariate test is show that PDTAXit has a positive and 
significant effect on DFINit either at high level of BTC or low level of BTC. Although in Table 6 
Panel B is known that firms with high level of BTC are more likely to make tax reporting 
aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness, but in Table 7 Panel A is well known that 
the impact of PDTAXit on DFINit in the low level of BTC is more positive and significant than in 
high level of BTC. The adjusted-R2 of firms with low level of BTC is greater than firms with 
high level of BTC. This is an early indication that firms with low level of BTC more weaken 
trade-offs between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness than firms 
with high level of BTC, consistent with H1. 
In Table 7 Panel B, we tested whether different level of BTC had an significant effect on 
the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness. 
Table 7 Panel B column (1) shows that the coefficient PDTAXit* SBTCit (β3) has a positive and 
significant effect on DFINit. In accordance with predictions, firm with low level of BTC more 
weakened trade-offs between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness 
than firms with high level of BTC levels. This is supported by the value of β1 (firm with high 
level of BTC) which is smaller and significant than the value of β1+β3 (firm with low level of 
BTC) on Wald-test. Thus, H1 is proven. These results support previous research. According to 
Shackelford and Shevlin (2001), the trade-offs of tax reporting and financial reporting faced by 
managers occur because apply the high BTC level. In otherwise, managers that do not face trade-
offs occur because apply low BTC level (Desai, 2002; Manzon & Plesko, 2002; Mills et al., 
2002; Boynton et al., 2005; Hanlon et al., 2005; Frank et al., 2009). 
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Because of BTC level are measured at industry level, this study also includes industry 
dummy variables to ensure that differential impact of tax reporting aggressiveness on financial 
reporting aggressiveness across different level of BTC are not caused by industrial factors. Table 
7 Panel B column (2) shows that the coefficient PDTAX it*SBTCit (β3) still has a positive and 
significant influence on DFINit, although it has been controlled by industrial dummy variable. 
Thus, H1 is proven. 
Table 7 
Relationship between Tax Reporting Aggressiveness and Financial Reporting 
Aggressiveness across Level of BTC  























































The dependent variable  is DFINit that measured by discretionary accruals for firm  i  in year t. 
PDTAXit is predicted value in equation (4) for firm i in year t. ΔPTCFOit is change in operating 





As explained before, we also conducts robustness checks to ensure that the results in Table 7 are 
robust. In this case, we replaces SBTCit variable with RankBTCit. The larger RankBTC, the higher 
level of BTC. Conversely, the smaller RankBTC, the lower level of BTC. Thus, equation (6) is 




RankBTCit = Ranking of BTC for firm i in year t . 
In accordance with H1, we predict that the coefficient β3 in equation (7) is negative and 
significant. In the higher level of BTC, firm tend to faced trade-offs when making financial 




reporting and tax reporting (Shackelford & Shevlin, 2001). Conversely, in the lower level of 
BTC, firm tends to making financial reporting aggressiveness and tax reporting aggressiveness in 
the same period (Desai, 2002; Manzon & Plesko, 2002; Mills et al., 2002; Boynton et al., 2005; 
Hanlon et al. , 2005; Frank et al., 2009). Table 8 columns (1) and (2) show that the coefficient 
PDTAXit*RankBTCit (β3) is negative and significant effect on DFINit. These results are consistent 
with the results presented in Table 7 of Panel B columns (1) and (2). Thus, the model is robust 
and supports H1. 
Table 8 
Robustness Check: Relationship between Tax Reporting Aggressiveness and Financial 
Reporting Aggressiveness across Level of BTC 
∗ ∆ (7) 










































in  operating  cash  flows  before  income  tax  paid  for  firm  i  between  year  t  and  t‐1 




This study was conducted to fill the gap of previous studies. Different from Frank et al. (2009) 
and Lennox et al. (2013), this study considers endogeneity problem to minimize biased results. 
This study was also examine the relationship between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial 
reporting aggressiveness across different level of BTC. Using the companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange, this study found that there is endogeneity problem in the relationship 
between tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness, but no causality 
relationship. In this case, only tax reporting aggressiveness that affects financial reporting 
aggressiveness, but not otherwise. In accordance with the predictions, this study also found that 
firm with a low level of BTC is more weakened trade-offs between tax reporting aggressiveness 
and financial reporting aggressiveness than firm with high level of BTC. These results are 
consistent either with or without include the industry dummy. These results support previous 
research.  
This study has several limitations. First, the period research used is quite short. Second, 
the proxy of tax reporting aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness used in this 
study is very limited. For further research is expected to add the period to get better results. In 
addition, next research is expected to use some proxy for tax reporting aggressiveness and 
financial reporting aggressiveness, for generalization purposes. Finally, further research is 
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expected to consider the role of corporate governance on the relationship between tax reporting 
aggressiveness and financial reporting aggressiveness. 
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